Islamic Finance and Globalization: A Convergence? by Mirakhor, Abbas
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Islamic Finance and Globalization: A
Convergence?
Abbas Mirakhor
2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56026/
MPRA Paper No. 56026, posted 20. May 2014 18:34 UTC
ﻢﻴﺣﺮﻟا ﻦﻤﺣﺮﻟا ﷲا ﻢﺴﺑ 
“Neither your creation (was) nor your resurrection (will be) 
except as one united soul”  The Qurān 31:28 
 
Islamic Finance and Globalization: A Convergence? 
 
Abbas Mirakhor∗
 
Abstract 
 
Islamic finance—understood as achieving maximum risk sharing—diversifies risk and allows 
it to be shared widely. Implications that follow are: (i) a close relationship between finance 
and real economic activities and (ii) the rate of return to finance determined by the rate of 
return to real economic activities rather than the reverse. This system’s full operation leads to 
financial stability, growth of income and employment, and, as a result, reduction in poverty. 
To obtain these results, preconditions must exist, including a developed financial system; rule 
of law; legal institutions that protect investors, creditors, and property rights; good 
governance; policy discipline to ensure macroeconomic stability; and trust in government and 
institutions. The network of rules and norms mandated by Islam, if implemented, satisfy these 
preconditions. A vast potential for financial engineering effort in Islamic finance could span 
each of its basic transaction modes into a menu of instruments for risk-sharing opportunity. 
The period since 1990 has witnessed dramatic and rapid change in the structure of financial 
markets and institutions around the globe. It is believed that the benefits of financial 
globalization would grow as economies are liberalized; legal, institutional and financial 
development in countries reach and surpass threshold levels; and greater variety of financial 
instruments of risk sharing are designed and developed. The paper explores the potential 
convergence of Islamic and conventional finance as these systems continue their progress in 
designing and developing better risk-sharing structure and much expanded menu of financial 
instruments. It discusses the legal, institutional, governance, and financial preconditions that 
should exist for equity finance to dominate debt financing. Finally, it suggests that most of the 
preconditions for Islamic finance to achieve its potential could be realized with 
operationalization of behavioral rules and norms mandated by Islam. 
I. Introduction 
1. Islamic finance, on the other, this paper probes whether it is possible that, at 
some point in the future, the conventional and Islamic finance would 
converge. The underlying justification for this enquiry is that, from a 
theoretical point of view, the objective of globalization and Islamic finance is 
to achieve maximum risk sharing (see explanation in paragraphs 12 and 13). 
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The fundamental axiom of Islamic finance is the simultaneous prohibition of 
debt-based financing and promotion of equity financing: the first reduces risk 
sharing and the second increases it. Similarly, financial globalization aims at 
spreading the investor base, and diversifying and sharing risk globally. This 
could be done through reliance on the most effective vehicle: equity or equity-
like finance. Therefore, at least from a theoretical stand point, as the 
conventional and Islamic finance progress through development of 
sophisticated risk-sharing instruments (including in the field of risk 
insurance), it could be expected that they converge, and it is natural that there 
would be perturbations, missteps, and short-run setbacks. However, in the 
longer run, they would both expand and their convergence would be feasible. 
From an empirical point of view, there is tantalizing evidence that, particularly 
in the last decade, the growth of financial globalization has been accompanied 
by increasing equity and equity-like cross-border flows. This growth has been 
faster than debt flows (bonds), especially to emerging markets (Table 1, 
Charts 1 and 2). On the other hand, the basic Islamic financial transaction 
modes are increasingly instrumentalized and securitized to enhance their 
attractiveness to global investors, thus, making convergence between Islamic 
and conventional finance a distinct possibility. Section II begins by 
considering financial globalization and its progress over the last decade. It will 
also focus on the conditions that should be met for financial globalization to 
achieve maximum risk sharing. Section III suggests that Islamic prohibition of 
debt-based finance and simultaneous promotion of risk sharing are consistent 
with the fundamental purpose of Islamic teachings, i.e., the unity of mankind, 
itself a corollary of the fundamental Islamic axiom of the Unity of the Creator. 
It will then discuss the rules and norms of behavior prescribed by Islam for 
individuals and collectivities that meet the conditions for maximum risk 
sharing. The section will also discuss the view that, based on historical 
consideration, financial globalization is neither inevitable nor irreversible. It 
will then refer to a historical episode of globalization of the early Middle 
Ages—where trade, finance, investment, and production were based on 
partnership and equity finance—and will explain how and why this episode 
witnessed finance evolve until dominance of debt financing which has lasted 
to the present. Section IV brings the ideas about the prospect for the 
convergence of conventional and Islamic finance to conclusion. It argues that 
their growth could lead to worldwide increase in investment, employment, and 
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economic growth; reduce inequality and poverty; and increase global welfare. 
These results would ultimately promote the unity of mankind. 
II. Financial globalization: Benefits, costs, and conditions for better risk 
sharing 
2. Globalization is a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional process of growing 
inter-connectedness among peoples and nations. Its main dimensions are 
cultural, socio-political, and financial. The last dimension is composed of 
financial globalization (the cross-border movement of capital) and financial 
integration (interconnectedness within and among financial markets). The 
combined economic and financial globalization refers to growing trade flows 
and unhindered movement of investment, production, and finance, which is 
accompanied by standardization of associated processes, regulations, and 
institutions, and facilitated by the free flow of information, ideas, and 
technology. In general, globalization is the result of reduced costs of 
information and transportation as well as liberalization of trade, finance, 
investment, capital controls, and factor movements (Mirakhor, 2005). 
3. Since 1990, the world has witnessed a dramatic and rapid change in the 
structure of financial markets and institutions. Progress in the theory of 
finance, rapid innovation in the practice of finance, revolution in information 
technology, deregulation and liberalization, and institutional reform have 
changed the nature of financial relations leading to the emergence of the “new 
finance.” As a result, the cost of finance has been reduced and investment in 
many instruments matching different risk-return profiles have been made 
possible, leading to better risk sharing among market participants worldwide. 
Financial transactions have become more at arm’s length, allowing broader 
participation in deeper and expanded markets. This, in turn, has expanded the 
number of participants in financial markets, dispersed ownership, and spread 
risks (Rajan, 2005).  Between 1991 and 2000, gross capital flows (the sum of 
absolute value of capital inflows and outflows) expanded by 300 percent 
among industrialized countries alone, the bulk of which was due to the rise in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio equity flows—both rising by 600 
percent—while bond flows over the same period increased by 130 percent 
(Evans and Hnatkovska, 2005). Over the same period, both stocks and flows 
of capital movements have increased substantially, especially in relation to the 
volume of domestic GDP and the size of financing markets. More recent data 
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(Table 1 and Charts 1, 5, 8) show that, after the market turbulence in 2000-02, 
these trends have resumed, with FDI and portfolio equity flows assuming a 
larger share of the total flow. The largest increase in FDI in 2006 was in the 
emerging Europe and the Middle East. Empirical evidence suggests that the 
composition of capital flows matters a great deal. Equity flows (portfolio 
equity flows + FDI + venture capital) promote better risk sharing, reduce 
volatility, and strengthen stability (Bekaert, 2000, 2006; Kose, et. al., 2006; 
Albuquerque, 2003; Alfaro, et. al., 2005). There is a substantial body of 
evidence that these flows, especially FDI, are positively associated with 
economic growth (Levchenko and Mauro, 2006). FDI is considered an 
important channel for transfer of technology and organizational knowledge 
(Borensztein, de Gregorïo, and Lee, 1998; Ayyagari and Kosová, 2006). Over 
the past few decades, stock markets too have shown increasing vitality, 
growing with a rapid surge. Development of stock markets increases the rate 
of saving and leads to growth in investment, while enhancing its quality. Stock 
markets diversify the investor base while distributing risks across investors, 
which, in turn, increase the resilience of the economy to shocks (IMF, Global 
Financial Stability Report, April 2007; IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 
2007). As mentioned earlier, the composition of capital flows has a significant 
influence on the economies, with FDI and equity flows exerting a great 
stabilizing influence on the economy’s vulnerabilities to shocks and financial 
crises. It has been demonstrated that greater reliance on debt flows exposes a 
country to a higher probability of sudden stops of international capital flows 
and to financial crises (Frankel and Rose, 1996). A growing body of research 
has demonstrated the positive impact of stock market development on 
economic growth (Henry, 2000; Stulz, 2005). 
4. There is an organic, interactive relationship between financial globalization 
and financial integration. On the one hand, the degree of progress of the latter 
depends on how well developed financial sectors are in countries. On the other 
hand, financial globalization plays an important catalytic role in the 
liberalization and development of the domestic financial markets (Häusler, 
2007). An important dimension of the process of financial sector development 
is expansion and quality improvement in credit and share markets (Levine, 
1997; Levine and Zervos, 1998). The process of financial development 
deepens markets and services that channel savings to productive investment 
and strengthens risk sharing. Liberalization of the stock market reduces the 
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cost of equity capital (Stulz, 1999a and b), leading to a surge in the growth 
rate of investment and expansion of employment and output. The effect would 
be stronger when stock market development is accompanied by privatization 
as the latter would be a signal of the country’s commitment to liberalization 
(Perotti and van Oijen, 1995, 2001). Financial sector development constitutes 
the most important channel of economic growth, particularly in countries that 
are finance-constrained (Ayyagari, et. al., 2006; Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 
2006). Empirical research over the last two decades, which has established the 
strong link between financial development and economic growth, has also 
identified the conduits between the two. These channels include: (i) greater 
involvement of private sector and better risk sharing; (ii) reduced risks that 
lower expected returns, leading to lower cost of capital and resulting in 
investment in higher-risk, higher-return projects; (iii) enhancement of 
competition and innovation; (iv) improved productivity; (v) lower output and 
income volatility; (vi) cost-efficiency gains in mobilizing resources for public 
investment; (vii) financial deepening as financial development leads to greater 
financial intermediation by banks, capital markets, and non-bank financial 
institutions; and (viii) reduced income inequality and poverty (Honohan, 2006; 
Demirgüç-Kunt, et. al., 2006; Beck, et. al., 2004 and 2007; Batra, et. al., 2003; 
Watkins, 2007; Ravallion, 2001, 2004, 2005; Ravallion and Chen, 2001; 
Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2006; Claessens and Perotti, 2006; Clarke, 2004; 
Goodhart, 2004). 
5. The benefits listed above would accrue if legal and institutional 
developments accompany financial development. The most important 
dimensions of the former are legal protection of creditor, investor, and 
property rights as well as contract enforcement (Clementi and MacDonald, 
2004). Good governance, transparency, and accountability are the important 
institutional aspects that support financial development (Johnson, et. al., 
2002). It is considered that, once a threshold level of availability of these legal 
and institutional developments is surpassed, the beneficial effects will accrue 
(Prasad, et. al., 2004). Empirical evidence suggests that countries with weak 
governance and low transparency receive less FDI and equity flows and have 
to resort to debt financing through bank loans that, as mentioned earlier, 
expose them to vulnerabilities and volatilities, leading to financial crises (Wei, 
2001; Gelos and Wei, 2002; Wei and Wu, 2002; Smarzynska and Wei, 2000; 
Wei, 1997, 2000a, b, and c, 2001; Kaufman, et. al., 2005, Abed and Gupta, 
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2002). Another factor that could exacerbate these problems is economic 
instability with research suggesting macroeconomic policies as an important 
determinant of the composition of capital flows (IMF, Global Financial 
Stability Report, Washington, D.C., April 2007; IMF, World Economic 
Outlook, Washington, D.C., April 2007). On the other hand, better legal 
institutions and improved governance and transparency reduce informational 
problems (adverse selection and moral hazard) and market frictions 
(Acemoglu, et. al., 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2003; Balgati, et. al., 2007). 
This will assist in the process of integration and deepening in the financial 
sector, which, in turn, will allow emergence of active and liquid equity 
markets, reduced cost of capital, and improved credit rating (Yartey, 2006). 
As a result, more investment projects become viable leading to greater risk 
sharing. More active equity markets are also associated with reduced 
volatility, again suggesting improved risk sharing. On the other hand, equity 
market opening against a backdrop of weak financial sector, inadequate 
institutional and legal development, and unstable macroeconomy “may not 
reduce variability at all and may even increase it” (Bekaert and Lundblad, 
2006). Research suggests that an interactive relationship exists between 
financial sector liberalization and development of an active equity market 
when a country achieves a threshold level of higher bureaucratic quality, 
lower level of corruption, and strengthened legal institutions (Prasad, et. al., 
2004). Stulz (2006) states that “financial systems with a higher degree of legal 
and institutional development that support finance increase stock market 
trading volumes and enhance the effect of financial openness.” In short, 
financial sector development—which is accompanied by legal and 
institutional developments that protect investor, creditor, property rights, 
enforce contracts, improve transparency, and lower corruption—promote 
equity market that, in turn, increase risk sharing (Wei, 2005; Faria and Mauro, 
2004; see also Black, 2000, for a helpful paper providing a list of the core 
institution needed to support the emergence, development, and operations of a 
strong securities market). 
6. Domestic financial sector development allows integration with the global 
market as it increases diversification opportunities and expands the set of 
financial instruments available for risk sharing. Economies that are open to 
two-way investments—domestic investors can invest in foreign assets and 
foreign investors in domestic assets—are said to be globally integrated. 
Islamic Finance and Globalization: A Convergence? 17
 
Financial integration, in turn, becomes an important channel of global risk 
sharing. There appears to be a symbiotic and interactive relationship between 
domestic financial development, financial integration, and financial 
globalization. Importantly, there is empirical evidence that financial 
development and integration reduce poverty through increased investment, 
employment, income, and reduced income inequality. Recent research has 
found that: (i) impact of financial development on poverty exerts two 
independent influences with half of the impact on economic growth and the 
other through reduction in income inequality; (ii) financial development leads 
to considerable deceleration in the rate of growth of income inequality; and 
(iii) as the process of financial development gathers momentum, the rate of 
reduction in the proportion of population living in poverty accelerates (Atje 
and Jovanovic, 1993; Beck, et. al., 2007; Claessens and Feijen, 2006; 
Ravallion, 2001, 2005; Clarke, et. al., 2003; Claessens and Perotti, 2006; 
Harrison, 2006). In sum, there appears to be considerable benefit to financial 
sector development and financial integration which are increased and 
accelerated as globalization of finance positively impacts and interacts with 
these two processes. 
7. On the assumption that significant informational problems and transactions 
costs are absent, theory suggests that integration and globalization of finance 
allow portfolios to be well diversified internationally and that capital flows 
into markets with the most favorable risk-return profiles. Thus, as risk sharing 
expands globally, capital is allocated more efficiently and welfare increases. 
Empirical evidence, however, suggests that risk sharing within countries and 
across borders is yet an insignificant fraction of its potential (Shiller, 2003). 
There are important paradoxes contradicting this theory: (i) Lucas paradox; 
(ii) home equity bias puzzle; and (iii) equity premium puzzle. First, Lucas 
(1990) argued that this theory suggests that capital-scarce countries have high 
rates of return to capital and should be able to attract investment from rich 
countries. The then data, however, did not show large flows of capital from 
the latter to the former. Indeed, most of the international capital flows, 
especially FDI and portfolio equity flows, took place among rich countries 
(Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003). Also, even then, equity flows were much more 
biased in favor of domestic (rather than international) markets than the theory 
suggests (Coval, 1999; Tesar, 1995b; French and Poterba, 1991). Research 
indicates that a very high percentage of aggregate stock market wealth is 
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composed of domestic equity (Aurelio, 2006). Furthermore, even in domestic 
markets of rich countries, investment in stock markets is a fraction of what the 
theory suggests, given that the returns to equity are much larger than justified 
on the basis of aversion to risk (Halaissos and Bertaut, 1995). Mehra and 
Prescott (1985) demonstrated that, over many decades, a large differential 
existed between the real rate of return to equity than to safe assets, i.e., U.S. 
Treasury bills. They also demonstrated that this differential was too large to be 
explained by existing theories of rational investor behavior. The implication 
presents a puzzle as to why rational investors, noting the differential, would 
not invest in equities up to the point where the remaining differential could be 
explained as the risk premium on equities. While Mehra and Prescott focused 
on the U.S. data in their 1985 paper, subsequent research emphasized that it 
existed in a number of countries, including India (Mehra, 2006). Recent 
research has shown the global character of this puzzle and has attributed a 
significant part of it to institutional factors (Erbaş and Mirakhor, 2007). 
Interestingly, in one of his recent papers, Mehra (2003) reports that the real 
worth of one dollar invested in equity in 1802 would have been worth nearly 
US$560,000 in 1997, whereas the real worth of the same US$1 invested in 
Treasury bills in 1802 would have been only US$276 over the same period. 
8. There is validity in the critics’ arguments on globalization that—despite the 
fact that globalization was expected to help the poor—poverty has not been 
reduced and that measures of inequality reveal that it has not decreased 
(Stiglitz, 2003, 2006; Lindert and Williamson, 2001; Mody and Murshid, 
2005; Ranciere, et. al., 2006; Tornell, et. al., 2004; Tesar, 1995; Goldberg and 
Pavcnik, 2007; Kaminsky and Schmuckler, 2002; van Wincoop, 1994, 1999; 
Wei and Wu, 2002). Moreover, there is empirical evidence of increased risks 
of volatility and financial crises (Aizenman, 2002; Kose, et. al., 2007). In 
response, researchers argue that the process of globalization is far from 
complete and that, at present, global economy and finance are undergoing 
major structural changes, creating a situation of “fluidity;” they have changed 
the usual “determinants of market valuation, volatility, leverage, velocity, and 
liquidation.” Each of these structural changes is significant on its own and in 
the way it interacts with others (El-Erian, 2007). These changes are: (i) 
positive productivity shocks associated with the growing integration of large 
segments of labor force in developing economies, rendering them a significant 
portion of global expansion; (ii) significant increase in commodity prices, 
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which has turned their producers, as a whole, into net global creditors, and (iii) 
considerable retrenchment in the barriers to entry (El-Erian, 2007). 
Additionally, even rapid innovation in the design of instruments of risk 
sharing has focused on a fraction of possibilities, and large potential markets 
that allow trade in broad claims on national income called “macro markets” 
have yet to be developed and tapped. “Some of these markets could be far 
larger in terms of the value of the risks traded than anything the world has yet 
experienced, dwarfing today’s stock markets” (Shiller, 2003). Shiller notes 
that “stock markets are claims on corporate dividends which are only a few 
percent of national income.” Finally, researchers suggest that, while the 
benefits of globalization have not been fully forthcoming with the scope and 
magnitude expected, the problem has not been the process of globalization, 
but rather the way in which it has proceeded, where the playing field has not 
been quite leveled and where many financial markets have a long way to 
develop to allow meaningful integration of wider and deeper risk sharing. 
Financial globalization does not automatically provide the expected benefits to 
many countries unless they have attained a threshold level of legal and 
institutional developments mentioned earlier (Chinn and Ito, 2002; Kose, 
et. al., 2007). 
9. Evidence suggests that countries that attain the threshold level of good legal 
and institutional developments are likely to attract more FDI and portfolio 
equity flows. In one such study, Faria and Mauro (2004) measured 
institutional quality as the average of six indicators—voice and accountability; 
political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; 
regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption—and found that 
countries that ranked higher on these indicators attracted more equity-like 
flows. Wei (2005) found evidence in a study on mutual funds that countries 
with a high degree of government and corporate transparency attract more 
equity investment because, as explained by Erbaş and Mirakhor (2007), 
transparency reduces adverse incentive and ambiguity effects. There is also 
empirical evidence that poor public institutions bias the composition of inflow 
of capital against equity-like flows and toward debt, exposing these countries 
to currency and financial crises and adversely affecting the country’s ability to 
use a given amount of capital inflow to stimulate economic growth. Stulz 
(2005) indicates that in many developing countries there is a “twin agency” 
problem stemming from poor corporate and state governance that feed on each 
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other. In countries with a “twin agency” problem, the risk of expropriation by 
corporations and state is high because “those who control a country’s state can 
establish, enforce, and break rules that affect investors’ payoffs within that 
country. When expropriation risks are significant, it is optimal for corporate 
ownership to be highly concentrated, which limits economic growth, risk 
sharing, financial development, and the impact of financial globalization” 
(Stulz, 2006). One study found that one dollar of cash is, on average, worth 
US$0.91 in countries with low corruption and only US$0.33 in countries with 
high corruption (Pinkowitz, et. al., 2004). Where the ‘twin agency’ problem 
exists, diffusion of ownership is weak, financial sector poorly developed, and 
investment and economic growth are low (Antunes and Tiago, 2003). Once a 
country begins to liberalize its financial market and improves legal institutions 
and governance, a virtuous circle becomes possible and globalization begins 
to play a positive role in encouraging further development of legal and 
institutional infrastructure that allows further development of the financial 
sector (Chinn and Ito, 2002). There is mounting evidence that in the last 
decade many developing countries have implemented reforms that promoted 
legal and institutional developments. They have improved governance, 
transparency, and accountability and have adopted regulatory and supervisory 
standards of best international practice in accounting and data reporting. They 
have also stabilized their economy with sound macro policies and debt 
management. Some have even borrowed or rented additional credibility by 
cross-listing their domestic corporate shares in more advanced markets 
(Doidge, et. al., 2004; Edison and Warnock, 2006; Karolyi, 2004). As a result, 
they have received increased capital inflows, with FDI and portfolio equity 
flows constituting a major portion of these flows (IMF: GFSR, April 2007; 
Dehesa, et. al., 2007; also see Table 1 and Charts 1, 7, and 8 of this paper). 
10. In addition to the evidence that many developing countries have improved 
their legal institutions and governance, there is some indication that the three 
paradoxes mentioned earlier—demonstrating divergence between theory and 
empirics of financial globalization—are beginning to lose strength. Lucas 
(2000) points out that the 21st Century will witness a reversal of the widening 
inequality among nations. His assertion is based on an analysis of a Solow-
type neoclassical model with global capital mobility, assuming that all 
countries have access to the same technology and institutions as well as to 
market-friendly economic policies. In this case, the “Lucas paradox”—that 
Islamic Finance and Globalization: A Convergence? 21
 
capital did not move from rich to poor countries—will no longer hold, and a 
“catch-up” process will rapidly narrow the income gap among countries. 
Lucas contends that more capital will move to developing countries, which is 
reasonable as they adopt policy and institutional infrastructure that will reduce 
their risk premium on investment. Developing countries’ adoption of the set of 
policies and institutions—sound macroeconomic policy, best-practice 
international standards of transparency, accountability, and good governance, 
as well as legal institutions that protect investor, creditor, property right, and 
enforce contracts—will reduce risk premium (Ju and Wei, 2006). It is not 
unrealistic that, as their financial sectors develop and international financial 
integration proceeds, assets of identical risk will command the same expected 
return, irrespective of spatial or domicile differences. Moreover, data from 
2000 show the increasing flow of capital to developing countries (Table 1, 
Chart 7). In recent years, equity flows to emerging markets have been stronger 
than bond flows, and equity market capitalization stronger than bond market 
capitalization (Tables 2-5, Charts 6-11).  Micro data are also beginning to 
reveal a perceptible shift of household assets portfolio allocation toward 
greater risk-sharing instruments. The data on the composition of households’ 
financial assets in Europe, USA, and Japan between 1995 and 2003 (Table 6) 
demonstrate that in the Euro area, the European Union, and the USA, 
households allocated a larger portion of their portfolio to risk-sharing 
instruments. While comparable figures are not available in other areas, similar 
behavior could be expected as policy, institutional, legal, and financial 
development progress in developing countries. Considering the Lucas paradox, 
Alfaro, et. al. (2005) concluded that “institutional quality is the leading causal 
variable” in explaining the paradox based on their empirical study. 
11. Recent empirical evidence also suggests that, since 2001, there has been a 
systematic decline in home bias, at least in US equity investments (IMF: 
GFSR, April 2007; Ammer, et. al., 2006; Aurelio, 2006; Kho, et. al., 2006). 
There has been also some empirical evidence that social capital (O’Hara, 
2004; Lorenz, 1999; Lopez-de-Silanes, et. a., 1997; Helliwell and Putman, 
1995; Berg, et. al., 1995; Ashraf, et. al., 2005; Dasgupta and Serageldin, 
1999)—especially trust, institutional and legal developments as well as greater 
transparency and availability of information—may, at least tentatively, explain 
the equity premium puzzle. The last decade has witnessed a growing body of 
empirical research demonstrating that finance, particularly risk-sharing 
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instruments like equity, is trust-intensive; therefore, in societies where the 
level of trust was high, financial sectors were deeper and more developed. In 
particular, this literature indicates that there is a high correlation between trust 
and development of the financial sector (Calderon, et. al., 2002; Guiso, et. al., 
2004). Importantly, if the level of trust is high, more reliance is placed on 
risky assets, such as equity. People invest a larger portion of their wealth in 
stocks, use more checks, and have access to greater amount of credit than in 
low-trust societies. Over the last decade, a number of researchers have 
demonstrated the impact of trust on economic performance (Knack and 
Keefer, 1997; Glaeser, 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001; Zak, 2003; Beugelsdijk, 
et. al., 2004). Arrow had suggested in 1975 that trust “is an important 
lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to 
have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s word” (Arrow, 1974). 
Fukuyama (1996) asserts that the general level of trust—an important 
component of social capital (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Glaeser, et. al., 1999; 
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002)—was a strong explanatory factor in the 
economic performance of industrial countries; the high level of trust was 
reinforced in these societies by strong institutions. A recent empirical paper 
(Guiso, et. al., 2005) demonstrates low trust as a crucial factor in explaining 
the low level of stock market participation, i.e., the equity premium puzzle. 
Based on the analysis of cross-country data, the paper suggests that where the 
level of trust is relatively high, investment in equity, in general, and in the 
stock market, in particular, is relatively high as well. Moreover, the paper 
asserts that in low-trust countries, equity participation depends on observance 
of the rule of law and the existence of legal institutions that protect property, 
creditor, and investor rights, and those that enforce contracts. It suggests that 
in low-performing economies not only is the level of trust low, but property 
and investor rights are poorly protected, and legal contract enforcement weak. 
Policy implication for these economies is to strengthen legal institutions, 
improve transparency, accountability, and governance—both in private and 
public sectors—and to provide the public with greater amount of information 
on risk sharing, in general, and equity markets, in particular. The growing 
body of empirical evidence over the last two decades has focused on the 
existence (or the lack) of strong institutions as a powerful factor explaining 
cross-country differences in economic performance. Recent research has 
underlined that the same legal and institutional factors are responsible for 
financial sector development and its ability to integrate with the global finance 
which would strengthen economic performance (Johnson, et. al., 2002).  
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III. Islamic Finance: Benefits and conditions for progress 
12. The central proposition of Islamic finance is the prohibition of the type of 
transaction in which a rent is collected as a percentage of an amount of 
principle loaned for a specific time period without the transfer of the property 
rights over the money loaned to the borrower, thus shifting the entire risk of 
the transaction to the borrower. As the Qurān prohibits debt-based contracts, it 
simultaneously ordains an alternative: in consonance with its systemic 
approach that as something is prohibited, an alternative is simultaneously 
ordained. The alternative to debt-based contracts is Al-Bay’ )ﻊﻴﺒﻟا( : a mutual 
exchange in which one bundle of property rights is exchanged for another (see 
Lane, 2003; Al-Isfahani, 1992; Ibn Mandhoor, 1984; Al-Mustafaoui, 1995), 
thus allowing both parties to share production, transportation, and marketing 
risks. It further allows both parties to exchange in order to reduce risk of 
income volatility and to allow consumption smoothing; a major outcome of 
risk sharing which increases welfare of the parties to the exchange. The 
emphasis on risk sharing is evident from one of the most important verses in 
the Qurān in respect of economic behavior. The verse states that: “… they say 
that indeed exchange )ﻊﻴﺑ(  is like usury (Riba). But Allah has permitted 
exchange and has forbidden usury…” (2:275). This verse can be considered as 
the cornerstone of the Qurān’s conception of economy since from it flows 
major implications of how the economy should be organized. One of these 
implications relates to the nature of these two contracts. Etymologically, the 
first, Al-Bay’ )ﻊﻴﺑ( , is a contract of exchange of one commodity for another 
where the property rights over one good is traded for those of another. In the 
case of contracts of Riba, a sum of money is loaned today for a larger sum in 
the future without the transfer of the property rights over the principle from 
the lender to the borrower. Not only does the lender retains property rights 
over the sum lent, but property rights over the additional sum paid as interest 
is transferred from the borrower to the lender. The verse renders exchange and 
trade of commodities (and assets) the foundation of economic activity. 
Important implications follow: exchange requires freedom of parties to 
contract. This in turn implies freedom to produce, which calls for clear and 
well-protected property rights that would permit production. Moreover, to 
freely and conveniently exchange, the parties need a place, i.e., a market. To 
operate successfully, the market needs rules, norms, and procedures to allow 
information to flow smoothly; trust to be established among buyers and 
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sellers; and competition to take place among sellers, on the one hand, and 
buyers, on the other; and transactions costs as well as costs to third parties, 
resulting from the adverse impact of exchange, to be reduced. Risk is a fact of 
human existence. Risks to income are important; when they materialize, they 
play havoc with people’s livelihood. It is therefore welfare-enhancing to 
reduce risk to income and lower the chances of its volatility to allow 
smoothing of consumption. This is accomplished by risk sharing and risk 
diversification which are facilitated by trade and exchange. By relying on 
exchange, the Qurān promotes risk sharing. Arguably, it can be claimed that 
through its rules governing just exchange, distribution, and redistribution, the 
entire Quranic position on economic relations is oriented toward risk sharing. 
This is perhaps the reason why in the Qurān more emphasis is placed on rules 
governing exchange distribution, and redistribution—to affect a balanced risk 
sharing—than on production. A further implication is that finance based on 
risk-return sharing means that the rate of return to finance has to be 
determined, ex post, by the rate of return on real activity rather than the 
reverse, which is the case when debt contracts finance production. 
13. It is clear that the objective is to promote risk sharing. But why? Here, an 
economic hermeneutic of the relevant verses placed within the systemic 
context of the Qurān strongly suggests that risk sharing, along with other 
prescribed behavioral rules, e.g., exhortation on cooperation (Qurān 5:2), 
serves to bring humans closer to unity, which in itself is a corollary of Islam’s 
central axiom: the Unity of the Creation. An Islamic philosophic axiom 
declares that from One Creator only one creation can issue. The Qurān itself 
unambiguously declares: “Neither your creation (was) nor your resurrection 
(will be) other than as one united soul” (Qurān 31:28; see also 4:1; 6:99). In a 
series of verses, the Qurān exhorts humans to take individual and collective 
actions to achieve social unity and cohesion and then strive to preserve and 
protect collectivity from all elements of disunity (e.g., 3:103). Unity and social 
cohesion are so central among the objectives of the Qurān for mankind that all 
conducts prohibited may be regarded as those that cause disunity and, 
conversely, those prescribed to promote and protect social cohesion. It is a 
natural consequence of such a system to require risk sharing as an instrument 
of social integration. Therefore, promoting maximum risk sharing is, arguably, 
the ultimate objective of Islamic finance. It is for this reason that profit-loss 
sharing and equity participation are considered as first best instruments of risk 
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sharing (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007; Mirakhor and Zaidi, 2007). Indeed, there 
is some evidence that stock market and social interaction are related (Hong, et. 
al., 2004; Huberman, 2001). One scholar that has recognized the full potential 
benefits of risk sharing for mankind is Shiller (2003). He points out that 
“[M]assive risk sharing can carry with it benefits far beyond that of reducing 
poverty and diminishing income inequality. The reduction of risks on a greater 
scale would provide substantial impetus to human and economic progress.” 
Arguably, the most meaningful human progress would be achieved when all 
distinctions among human beings on the basis of race, color, creed, income, 
and wealth are obliterated to the point where humanity truly views itself as 
one. The Qurān (4:1) unambiguously calls attention to the fact that, despite all 
apparent multiplicity, humans are fundamentally of one kind and rejects all 
bases for distinction between and among them except righteousness (Qurān 
49:13). This axiom applies to all dimensions of human existence on this 
planet, including in the fields of economics and finance. The objective of the 
unity of mankind could well be promoted by financial globalization since it 
has the potential of being the great equalizer of our time. It has the ability to 
unwind and unbundle, direct, analyze, and price risk searching for the highest 
return. It can explore all risk-return to assets and the real rate of return, leading 
to greater risk sharing. It can do so across geographic, racial, national, 
religious, cultural, language, and time boundaries. In the process, it can level 
playing fields of finance and help remove barriers among people and nations. 
The same potential holds for Islamic finance if progress follows the trajectory 
envisioned by Islam, which specifies preconditions for the successful 
operation of financial arrangements within its framework firmly anchored on a 
network of norms and rules of behavior (institutions), prescribed for 
individuals and collectivities (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2002). This network 
includes, but is not limited to, those institutions that modern scholarship 
considers crucial for financial development, integration, and globalization 
(Garretsen, et. al., 2003). 
14. Among the institutions prescribed by Islam are: (i) property rights; (ii) 
contracts; (iii) trust; and (iv) governance. The word “property” is defined as a 
bundle of rights, duties, powers, and liabilities with respect to an asset. In the 
Western concept, private property is considered the right of an individual to 
use and dispose of a property along with the right to exclude others from the 
use of that property. Even in the evolution of Western economies, this is a 
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rather new conception of property that is thought to have accompanied the 
emergence of the market economy. Before that, however, while a grant of the 
property rights in land and other assets was the right to use and enjoy the 
asset, it did not include the right to dispose of it or exclude others from its use. 
For example, the right to use the revenues from a parcel of land, a corporate 
charter, or a monopoly granted by the state did not carry the right of disposing 
of the property. It is thought that the development of the market economy 
necessitated a revision of this conception of property since it was thought that 
the right not to be excluded from the use of assets owned by another 
individual was not marketable; it was deemed impossible to reconcile this 
particular right with a market economy. Hence, of the two earlier property 
rights principles—the right to exclude others and the right not to be excluded 
by others—the latter was abandoned and the new conception of property 
rights was narrowed to cover only the right to exclude others. In Islam, 
however, this right is retained without diminishing the role of the market as a 
resource allocation and impulse transmission mechanism within the 
framework; property ownership is ruled by a set of property rights and 
obligations (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). 
15. The first principle of Islamic property rights is that the Supreme Creator is 
the ultimate owner of all properties and assets, but in order that humans 
become materially able to perform duties and obligations prescribed by the 
Law Giver, they have been granted a conditional right of possession of 
property; this right is granted to the collectivity of humans. The second 
principle establishes the right of collectivity to the created resources. The third 
principle allows individuals to appropriate the products resulting from the 
combination of their labor of these resources, without the collectivity losing its 
original rights either to the resources or to the goods and services by 
individuals. The fourth principle recognizes only two ways in which 
individuals accrue rights to property: (i) through their own creative labor 
and/or (ii) through transfers—via exchange, contracts, grants, or inheritance—
from others who have gained property rights title to a property or an asset 
through their labor. Fundamentally, therefore, work is the basis of acquisition 
of right to property. Work, however, is not only performed for the purpose of 
satisfaction of wants or needs, it is considered a duty and obligation required 
from everyone. Similarly, access and use of natural resources for producing 
goods and services is also everyone’s right and obligation. So long as 
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individuals are able, they have both the right and the obligation to apply their 
creative labor to natural resources to produce goods and services needed in the 
society. However, if individuals lack the ability, they no longer have an 
obligation to work and produce without losing their original right to resources. 
Therefore, an important principle called “immutability or invariance of 
ownership” constitutes the fifth principle of property rights in Islam (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2007). The latter writes the duty of sharing into Islam’s principles 
of property rights and obligations. Before any work is performed in 
conjunction with natural resources, all members of the society have equal right 
and opportunity to access these resources. When individuals apply their 
creative labor to resources, they gain a right of priority in the possession, use 
or market exchange of the resulting product without nullifying the rights of the 
needy in the sale proceeds of the product. As a result, the sixth principle 
imposes the duty of sharing the monetary proceeds after the sale of the 
property. This principle regards private property ownership rights as a trust 
held to affect sharing. The seventh principle imposes limitation on the right of 
disposing of the property—presumably absolute in the Western conception of 
property rights. Individuals have a severely mandated obligation not to waste, 
destroy, squander, or use property for unlawful purposes. Once the specified 
property obligations are appropriately discharged, including that of sharing in 
the prescribed amount and manner, property rights are held inviolate and no 
one can force appropriation or expropriation. This right is held so sacred that 
even, in relatively modern times, when a rule had to be developed to 
accommodate emergency cases, e.g., exercise of eminent domain for 
expropriation of land for public utility development, it was called “ikrah 
hukmi,” i.e., “unpleasant necessity,” a legitimate violation (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2007). Even in these unusual cases, action could be taken only after 
adequate compensation was paid to the owner. 
16. While the above principles strongly affirm the human’s natural tendency 
to possess—particularly products resulting from individual creative labor—the 
concomitant private property obligations give rise to the interdependence 
among members of the society. Private initiative, choice, and reward are 
recognized but not allowed to subvert the obligation of sharing. The 
inviolability of appropriately acquired private property rights in Islam 
deserves emphasis. As observed by a legal expert (Habachy, 1962), given the 
divine origin of Islam, “its institutions, such as individual ownership, private 
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rights, and contractual obligations, share its sacredness. To the authority of 
law, as it is understood in the West, is added the great weight of religion. 
Infringement of the property and rights of another person is not only a trespass 
against the law; it is also a sin against the religion and its God. Private 
ownership and individual rights are gifts from God, and creative labor, 
inheritance, contract, and other lawful means of acquiring property or 
entitlement to rights are only channels of God’s bounty and goodness to man. 
All Muslim schools teach that private property and rights are inviolable in 
relations between individuals as well as in relations with the state. It is not 
only by their divine origin that the Muslim institutions of private ownership 
and right differ from their counterpart in Western system of law; their content 
and range of application are more far-reaching. If absolutes can be compared, 
it can be safely said that the right of ownership in Muslim law is more 
absolute than it is in modern system of law. The Muslim concept of property 
and right is less restricted than is the modern concept of these institutions.” 
17. In a terse, unambiguous verse, the Qurān exhorts the believers to “be 
faithful to contracts” (5:1). This command, buttressed by other verses (2:282, 
6:151-153; 9:4; 16:91-94; 17:34-36; 23:8), establishes the observance and 
faithfulness to the terms of contract as the central anchor of a complex 
relationship between: (i) the Creator and His created order, including humans; 
(ii) the Creator and the human collectivities; (iii) individuals and the state, 
which represents the collectivity; (iv) human collectivities, and (v) 
individuals. The concept of contracts in Islam transcends its usual conception 
as a legal institution “necessary for the satisfaction of legitimate human need.” 
It is considered that the entire fabric of the Devine Law is contractual in its 
concept and content (Habachy, 1962). Contract binds humans to the Creator, 
and binds them together. As Habachy suggests: “This is not only true of 
private law contacts, but also of public law contracts and international law 
treaties. Every public office in Islam, even the Imamate (temporal and 
spiritual leadership of the society), is regarded as a contract, an agreement 
(áqd) that defines the rights and obligations of the parties. Every contract 
entered into by the faithful must include a forthright intention to remain loyal 
to performing the obligations specified by the terms of contract.” The 
fulfillment of contracts is exalted in the Qurān to rank it with the highest 
achievements and noblest virtues (2:172) (Habachy, 1962). 
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18. The divinely mandated command of faithfulness to the terms and 
conditions of contracts and abiding by its obligations is undergirded by the 
equally strong and divinely originated institution of trust (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 
2007; Kourides, 1970). There is strong interdependence between contract and 
trust; without the latter, contracts become difficult to enter into and costly to 
monitor and enforce. When and where trust is weak, laws and complex, 
expensive administrative apparatuses are needed to enforce contracts. Perhaps 
this is why so much emphasis is placed on trust: to make entering into and 
enforcing contracts less costly. Accordingly, the Qurān, in a number of verses 
proclaims trustworthiness as a sign of true belief and insists on remaining fully 
conscious of the obligation of ensuring that the intention to remain trustworthy 
in fulfilling the terms and conditions proceeds promises or entering into 
contracts. Conversely untrustworthiness and betrayal of trust are considered a 
clear sign of disbelief (2:27; 2:40; 2:80; 2:177; 2:282-83; 3:161; 4:107; 4:155; 
6:153; 7:85; 8:27; 8:58; 9:12; 9:75; 9:111; 11:85; 13:20; 16:91; 16:94; 16:95; 
17:34; 23:8). Moreover, the Qurān makes clear that fulfilling the obligations 
of a contract or a promise is mandatory. In short, the Qurān makes trust and 
trustworthiness, as well as keeping faith with contracts and promises, 
obligatory and has rendered them inviolable except in the event of an 
explicitly permissible justification (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007; Habachy, 
1962). In addition, there are numerous prophetic sayings that supplement the 
Quranic verses on trust. For example, it is reported that the prophet )ﷲا ﻰﻠﺻ 
ﻢﻠﺳو ﻪﻟﺁو ﻪﻴﻠﻋ(  was asked: who is a believer. He replied: “a believer is a person 
to whom people can trust their person and possession,” (Habachy, 1962). It is 
also reported that he said: “the person who is not trustworthy has no faith, and 
the person who breaks his promise has no religion.” Also, “keeping promises 
is a sign of faith,” and “there are three (behavioral traits) if found in a person, 
then he is a hypocrite even if he fasts, prays, performs big and small 
pilgrimages, and declares “I am a Muslim”: when he speaks, he lies; when he 
promises, he breeches; and when trusted, he betrays” (Payandeh, 1984; Iqbal 
and Mirakhor, 2007). 
19. Other than the above, there are other individual and collective behavioral 
rules and norms that strengthen the governance structure of the state and 
firms, including transparency, accountability, voice, and representation. 
Nevertheless, the three basic institutions: property rights, contracts, and trust 
give a flavor of the strength of governance in Islam. The rule of Law governs 
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the behavior of state rulers no less stringently than those of individuals. As 
two Western legal experts (Anderson and Coulson, 1958) observe: “Islam is 
the direct rule of God. His Law, the Shari’a, is the sole criterion of behavior,” 
and “the authority of the temporal ruler is both derived and defined by this 
law.” Under the rule of Law, “the ruler is by no means a free agent in the 
determination of the public interest,” and the decisions that the ruler makes 
“must not be arbitrary, but rather the result of conscientious reasoning on the 
basis of the general principles of the Shari’a as enunciated in the authoritative 
texts.” These legal experts also assert that, based on their consideration of 
Islamic legal texts, the command of observing contracts and covenants 
faithfully “apply to the ruler acting in a public capacity” just as severely as to 
individuals. “Indeed, when considerations of expediency and public interests 
are taken into account, they apply even with greater force to the actions of the 
ruler.” Therefore, a breech of faith on the part of a ruler is more heinous in its 
nature and serious in its consequence than of individuals. Importantly, they 
observe that “just as the ruler has no special prerogative or exemptions as 
regards the substantive law, so he has none regarding the application of the 
law through the courts. Ideally, the jurisdiction of the Qādi (the judge), the 
only person qualified to apply the Shari’a, is comprehensive and exclusive. 
The principle that no one can be judge in his own cause is firmly established 
in the legal texts, and when personally involved, the ruler should submit to the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary Qādi’s courts. the ruler that breaks faith cannot 
shelter behind any claim of sovereignty from the dictates of the law which 
brooks no such plea.” The same principles of governance under which a ruler 
or a state should function apply also to firms. Iqbal and Mirakhor (2005) argue 
that within the Islamic framework a firm can be viewed as a “nexus of 
contracts” whose objective is to minimize transaction costs and maximize 
profits and returns to investors subject to constraints that these objectives do 
not violate the property rights of any party whether it interacts with the firm 
directly or indirectly. In pursuit of these goals, the firm honors all implicit or 
explicit contractual obligations. As could be discerned from the discussions on 
contracts and trust, it is incumbent on individuals to preserve the sanctity of 
implicit contractual obligations no less than those of explicit contracts. By the 
same token, firms have to preserve the sanctity of implicit and explicit 
contractual obligations by recognizing and protecting the property rights of 
stakeholders, community, society, and state. Since the firm’s behavior is 
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shaped by that of its managers, it becomes their fiduciary duty to manage the 
firm as a trust for all stakeholders in ensuring that the behavior of the  
firm conforms to the rules and norms specified by the Law (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2004). 
20. Even from the above rather cursory consideration, it should become clear 
that, once fully implemented, Islamic institutional framework would support 
rapid financial development and encourage financial integration and 
globalization which, in turn, would promote risk sharing. The institutions 
ordained by Islam reduce uncertainty and ambiguity to ensure predictable 
behavior. Islam also prescribes rules regarding income and wealth sharing to 
promote income-consumption smoothing. Arguably, sharing of economic 
risks in the society is of great concern to Islam. This is evidenced by the 
strong position taken by the Qurān on distributive justice through Zakat, an 
obligatory 2.5 percent of wealth, as well as additional exhortation for 
voluntary economic assistance to those less able; all of which are insurance 
against income risk. However, these institutions are exceptional by their 
absence in many, if not all, Muslim countries (Chapra, 2000). In case of the 
Middle-Eastern and North-African (MENA) region, for example, Abed and 
Davoodi (2003) found that the rates of growth in this region since the 1970s 
have not only been lower than those of developing countries as a whole, but 
that they have been twice as volatile as developing countries’ average. They 
attribute this poor performance to: high population growth and low 
productivity; lagging political and institutional reforms; large and costly 
public sectors; inefficient and inequitable educational system; underdeveloped 
financial markets; high trade restrictiveness; and inappropriate exchange rate 
policies. It should be clear that poor governance; transparency; accountability; 
inadequate judicial system; and weak property, creditor, and investor rights all 
have played a role in the poor growth performance of the region; ills that 
could be treated with the development of the legal and institutional 
developments prescribed by Islam. While this process has not had any 
impetus, a number of Muslim countries, in and out of the MENA region, have 
recently implemented macroeconomic and structural reform policies and have 
adopted international best-practice standards and codes. As a result, the 
economic performance of these countries has improved markedly, also helped 
by increase in oil revenue. While adoption, implementation, and development 
of Islamic institutions may be slow, implementation of international best 
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practice of transparency and accountability plus development of an 
independent and effective judiciary and the reform of the legal system—to 
protect property, creditor, and investor rights and enforce contracts—and 
promotion of financial sector development could increase investment, 
employment, and income leading to reduction in poverty. 
21. Islamic finance has experienced rapid growth,1 especially over the last 
decade. Its growth is astonishing, given that its analytic underpinnings, in 
modern economic and financial term, were explained two decades ago (Khan 
and Mirakhor, 1987). There is no accurate estimate of the size of the market at 
present, but it is certain that it is nowhere near its potential. Just as is the case 
with financial globalization, Islamic finance has realized only an insignificant 
fraction of its risk-sharing capacity; of the 15 basic modes of available 
transactions, only a few have been used widely and even then only a few 
instruments have been innovated based on these transactions modes (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2002). Nearly three decades ago, beginning with Ross (1976, 
1978), theory of finance showed that a basic instrument could be spanned into 
a large number (Huberman, et. al., 1987a and b; Bekaert and Urias, 1996; 
Fearson, et. al., 1993). The wide ranges of instrument innovations of the new 
finance since then have demonstrated the validity of this idea. Undoubtedly, 
the process of instrument design within the field of Islamic finance will gather 
momentum once it attracts the needed expertise. At the time being, this is the 
most important challenge of Islamic finance (Baldwin, 2002; Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 1999). The lack of expertise has been the reason why, so far, 
financial engineering in designing new instruments has focused on fast 
tracking a reverse-engineering process of redesigning some conventional 
vehicles. Not only the process of instrument design has to accelerate based on 
the approved transactions modes, but also inventions of new instruments 
paralleling Shiller’s (2003) ideas on “macro markets” should start; here the 
potential is great. For example, virtually all government deficit financing in 
Muslim countries are debt-based. To remedy this, Nadeem-Ul-Haque and 
Mirakhor (1999) proposed an equity instrument to be sold by governments 
with its rate of return indexed to the rate of return to domestic, Islamic 
countries, and international-Islamic equity markets, each with specified 
weights. The analytic arguments underpinning this proposal were explained by 
                                                 
1. See Financial Times reports: Islamic Finance May 24, 2007, for estimates of growth, size, 
and potential of Islamic Finance. 
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Choudhry and Mirakhor (1997). The reason governments would want to raise 
funds is to supply social overhead capital, defense, health, and education. If 
the private sector was either unwilling or unable to undertake the production 
of these public goods, it would fall on governments to undertake the needed 
investments and cover the related expenditure with usual government revenue. 
The shortfall would be covered by floating the equity instrument, which would 
be, in essence, an instrument backed by assets represented by either earlier 
bundles of social overhead capital already completed or in train, e.g., roads, 
dams, hospitals, and the like. Since these are lumpy investments and their 
public goods nature provides a higher social return than investments 
undertaken by the private sector, the rate of return must be at least as high as 
the rate of return to be paid by the private sector when raising equity in the 
stock market. But, since domestic markets may experience volatilities to 
which government finance should not be exposed, Nadeem-Ul-Haque and 
Mirakhor suggested adding two other markets—the index of returns to all 
Islamic countries’ stock returns and the index of returns to Islamic equity 
funds in the West—to the index of returns to the domestic equity market. 
There are obvious advantages to this instrument; one being a vehicle for 
integration of equity markets across the world, while the other would be 
globalization of this instrument, forcing governments to compete for funds 
domestically, regionally, and globally, leading to efficiency gains. 
22. How likely is it that conventional and Islamic finance converge as they 
both go through the globalization process? The answer, would be quite likely 
if global finance relied more extensively on equity or equity-like flows, on the 
one hand, and invent/innovate a wider spectrum of risk-sharing instruments, 
on the other. The same process of innovations in Islamic finance would allow 
an asymptotic convergence between the two. Nearly five decades ago, 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that, in the absence of frictions, firms’ 
financial structure would be indifferent between debt and equity. In the real 
world, there are a number of frictions that bias financial structures in favor of 
debt and debt-based contracts. The two most important are tax and 
information. The tax treatment of equity returns and interest in industrial 
countries, which dominate the world of finance and the present structure of 
capital flows, is heavily biased against equities. Informational problems 
(information asymmetry and the related problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection) also bias financial transactions in favor of debt or debt-based 
contracts. Legal-financial systems in advanced countries are also structured, 
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tilting in favor of debt and debt-based transactions. However, as financial 
market developments progress, legal and institutional developments across the 
world accelerate, and information technology advances, the informational 
problems diminish. Whether tax and legal treatment of equity versus debt will 
become less biased is a policy question. What is clear is that as informational 
problems decline, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain legal, 
institutional, and tax policy impediments to level the playing field between 
equity and debt. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to expect a process of 
decreasing dominance of the financial system by debt and debt-based 
instruments, which has not been without costs, including severe financial 
crises. This dominance has been a major part of the financial scene globally 
for so long that it is difficult to note that there was a period in the evolution of 
finance when equity and partnership were the dominant mode of transaction in 
the Middle Ages. There has been some recent research suggesting that 
financial globalization is not irreversible. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue 
that there have been periods in history, specifically 1870-1913, when the 
degree of global financial integration was no less than the current degree. Yet, 
as a result of world wars, stock markets crush, and a worldwide depression, 
not only the global integration stopped, it did not resume until recently 
(Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003; Faria, et. al., 2006). Same catastrophic factors can 
explain an even earlier episode of reversal of financial integration in the 
Middle Ages. 
23. Before the beginning of the 20th Century, economic historians of the 
Middle Ages all but ignored the importance of trade and financial relations 
between Europe and the rest of the world, which were crucial to the economic 
development of the West before the 15th Century (Udovitch, 1967). Abu-
Lughod (1994) contends that this was due to the belief held by the Eurocentric 
scholarship that globalized trade became relevant only after the “rise of the 
West” in the late 15th Century. According to Abu-Lughod, an advanced 
globalized system of trade “already existed by the second half of the 
Thirteenth Century, one that included almost all regions (only the “New 
World” was missing). However, it was a world-system that Europe had only 
recently joined and in which it played only a peripheral role.” Abu-Lughod 
maps growing global trade flows between 737 and 1478 A.D., demonstrating 
that trade flows first centered in Mesopotamia and spread rapidly over the next 
eight centuries throughout the then-known world to become global (Frank, 
1990; Gills and Frank, 1994). Beginning with Postan (1928), economic 
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historians have indicated that these trade flows were supported by a financial 
system sustained by an expanding risk-sharing credit structure based on 
commenda and maona. Commenda is identical to mudaraba, and maona 
partnerships are either musharaka or mudaraba, depending on the nature of 
activity undertaken by the partners (see Labib, 1969; Lane, 1944; Day, 2002; 
and Udovitch, 1962; De Somogyi, 1965; Ehrenkreuz, 1959; Imamuddin, 1960; 
Tuma, 1965). Postan’s paper, based on his investigations in the vast 
commercial archives of the Middle Ages in England, was path-breaking as it 
demonstrated that: (i) economists and historians had, until then, 
underestimated the growth of the volume of credit in the Middle Ages, and (ii) 
the bulk of this credit was either commenda or commenda-like, joint risk-
sharing partnerships, even if they were “miscalled or modified” as loans 
(Postan, 1928, 1957). There is little doubt that the institutions of commenda 
and maona originated in the Islamic world (Udovitch, 1962, 1967, 1970). 
These institutions, along with financial instruments, such as hawala and 
suftaja, were transmitted to Europe and to other regions by Jewish scholars 
and merchants throughout the Jewish Diaspora (Fischel, 1933, 1937), and via 
Spain through trade and scholastic borrowing from Islamic sources (Mirakhor, 
2003). Professor Gotein of Princeton University painstakingly researched the 
documents known as the Geniza2 records and reached the conclusions 
(Goitein, 1954, 1955, 1962, 1964, 1967) that: (i) trade in the Middle Ages was 
both extensive and intensive, financed by risk-sharing partnerships; (ii) 
partnership was used in industrial, commercial, and in public administration 
projects; (iii) the Mediterranean and Indian trade, as revealed by the Cairo 
Geniza, were largely not based on cash benefits or legal guarantees, but on the 
human qualities of mutual trust and friendship; and (iv) even a cursory 
examination of the Geniza material proves that lending money for interest was 
not only shunned religiously, but was also of limited significance 
economically. 
 
2. Gotein (1964, p. 315) refers to “the so-called Cairo Geniza” as “a treasure of manuscripts written 
mainly during the Fatimid and Ayyubid periods and originally preserved in a synagogue in Old Cairo.” 
Further, he indicates that “Geniza “pronounced: Gheneeza), as may be remarked in passing, is derived 
from the same Persian word as Arabic  “Janazah,”  burial, and has almost the same meaning. It is a place 
where discarded writings were buried so that the name of God, which might have been written on them, 
might not be discarded. Thus, Geniza is the opposite of an orderly archive.” He further informs that “… 
the documents discussed in this paper, albeit mostly written in Hebrew characters, are in Arabic 
language.” There are a number of Geniza centers of scholarship in the USA and the UK (Imad, 2005). 
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24. Studying both the Geniza records as well as Islamic Fiqh (jurisprudence) 
sources, Udovitch reaches the following conclusions: (i) “there is remarkable 
symmetry between the Hanafite legal formulations of the late-8th Century and 
the documented commercial practices of the 11th and 12th Centuries Geniza 
merchants: (Udovitch, 1962, 1967); (ii) he reaffirms Gotein’s conclusion that 
researching “the extensive commercial records of the Geniza, we found 
comparatively little evidence of usurious transactions” (Udovitch, 1970a and 
b). Moreover, research by Medieval historians demonstrated the extensive use 
of risk-sharing partnerships (Adelson, 1960; Arfoe, 1987; Ashtor, 1975, 1976, 
1983; Byrne, 1920, 1930; Exenberger, 2004; Laiou, 2002; Lieber, 1968; 
Lopez, 1951, 1952, 1955). While risk-sharing techniques continued to prevail 
in Europe until the mid-17th Century, beginning in mid-16th Century, the 
institution of interest-based debt financing also began to be used more widely 
and extensively throughout Europe (Munro, 2003). The explanation for the 
initial utilization of this method of financing and its dominance over risk-
sharing methods has been a combination of several factors, including (i) the 
demise of the scholastic prohibition of usury (Munro, 2003; Sauer, 2002); (ii) 
the appearance and rapid growth of fractional reserve banking that led to 
specialization of finance by intermediaries who preferred to provide financing 
to agent-entrepreneurs at fixed interest rates based on contracts enforceable by 
law and the state in order to reduce monitoring and transaction costs; (iii) 
inflow of vast amounts of gold and other riches into Europe from the colonies 
in the Americas and elsewhere, which reduced the incentive for the elite 
classes to continue financing trade on the basis of risk sharing, preferring 
fixed interest debt contracts; (iv) the emergence of nation-states whose 
governments needed finance for wars or other state activities, but could not 
raise resources except by means of fixed interest rate contracts according to 
which an annuity was paid in perpetuity without the need for governments to 
repay the principal (Michie, 2007); most importantly was the process of 
securitization in the 14th Century, an innovation that created a revolution in 
mobilizing financial resources (Michie, 2007). It is likely, however, that the 
breakdown of trust in Europe and elsewhere was a major factor for the loss of 
dominance of risk-sharing finance by the end of the Middle Ages. As 
mentioned earlier, risk-sharing finance is trust-intensive, and trade financing 
during the Middle Ages was based on risk sharing which, in turn, was based 
on mutual trust (Goitein, 1964). Recent research indicates that catastrophic 
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and traumatic experience contributes to the breakdown of trust in a 
community and among its members (Alesina, et. al., 2002). If so, the Middle 
Ages certainly witnessed enormous, continuous, and extensive traumas, 
including four crusades, three Mongol invasions, numerous wars in Europe, 
which are only a few of the traumatic experiences of the age. In addition to 
these events was the Bubonic plague of the mid-15th Century that spread 
rapidly throughout the then-known world along well-established and 
intensively traveled trade routes (Abu-Lughod, 1994). 
25. It is well known that the full-scale adoption of a fixed-interest-based 
financial system, with a fractional reserve banking sector at its core, has a 
major deficiency; the system is inherently fragile (Minsky, 1982; Khan, 1987; 
Posen, 2001). Toward end-1970s and early-1980s, existence of financial 
intermediaries, in general, and banks, in particular, was justified due to their 
ability to reduce transaction and monitoring costs as well as to manage risk. 
However, minimal attention was paid to reasons why banks operated on the 
basis of fixed, predetermined interest-rate-based contracts, i.e., on a fixed 
interest basis that rendered the system fragile and unstable, requiring a lender 
of last resort to regulate it. Generally, interest rate theories explain the rate as 
an equilibrating mechanism between supply of and demand for finance, which 
is a rate that prevails in the market as a spot price and not as a price 
determined ex ante and fixed, tied to the principle and the period covered by 
the debt contract. In an important paper, Bhattacharya (1982) argued that: “… 
with risk-neutral preferences, when the choice of risk level is unobservable, 
then any sacrifice of higher mean asset payoff constitutes an inefficient 
choice. The classical model of intermediaries existing to save on 
transactions/monitoring costs in asset choice does not explain why their 
liability structure should not be all equity.” With the development and growth 
of information economics and agency literature, another explanation was 
added to the list of reasons for the existence of intermediaries. They served as 
delegated monitoring as well as signaling agents to solve the informational 
problems, including asymmetric information existing between principals and 
agents. Based on the findings of the developing field of information 
economics (see, in particular Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), it has been argued that 
adverse selection and moral hazard effects in a banking system operating on 
the basis of fixed-fee contracts in the presence of asymmetric information—
particularly in cases where this problem is acute—means that some groups 
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will be excluded from the credit market even when the expected rate of return 
for these groups may be higher than for those with access to credit. 
Furthermore, risk-return sharing contracts, e.g., equity, are not subject to 
adverse selection and moral hazard effects, “the expected return to an equity 
investor would be exactly the same as the expected return of the project itself” 
(Cho, 1986). 
26. The fragility of a financial system operating on the basis of fixed, 
predetermined interest rate was underlined by Stiglitz (1988) who argued that 
“interest rate is not like a conventional price. It is a promise to pay an amount 
in the future. Promises are often broken. If they were not, there would be no 
issue in determining creditworthiness. Raising interest rates may not increase 
the expected return to a loan; at higher interest rates one obtains a lower 
quality set of applicants (adverse selection effect) and each one’s applicants 
undertakes greater risks (the adverse incentive effect). These effects are 
sufficiently strong that the net return may be lowered as banks increase the 
interest rates charged: it does not pay to charge higher interest rates.” The 
findings of the new field of information economics strengthened the 
arguments of Minsky (1982) and others that a debt-based financial system 
with the fractional reserve banking—operating with a fixed, predetermined 
interest rate mechanism at its core—is inherently fragile and prone to periodic 
instability. Stiglitz’s findings underlined Minsky’s arguments that, as returns 
to banks decline, unable to raise interest rates on their loans, they enter a 
liability-management mode by increasing interest rates on their deposits. As 
this vicious circle continues to pick up momentum, the liability management 
transforms into Ponzi financing and eventually bank runs develop (Posen, 
2001). The last two decades of the 20th Century witnessed a number of global 
bouts with financial instability and debt crises with devastating consequences 
for a large segment of humanity, thus raising consciousness regarding 
vulnerability and fragility of the financial systems which are based, at their 
core, on fixed-price debt contracts. As previously emphasized, legal and 
institutional developments, along with good governance and adoption of 
standards of best practice in transparency and accountability at the level of 
individuals, firms, and state, buttressed by information technology advances, 
will mitigate the informational problems leading to lesser reliance on debt-
based contracts. 
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IV. Summary and conclusions 
27. This paper has addressed a question regarding the future of financial 
globalization, and of Islamic finance: will conventional finance, at the heart of 
the current financial globalization, and Islamic finance converge? The paper 
began by considering the recent development and the future of financial 
globalization. There is evidence that financial globalization has not been as 
helpful as expected, given the potential of its benefits for growth of 
investment, employment, and income as well for reduction of income 
inequality and poverty. The paper argues that, ultimately, the success of 
globalization will depend on the spread and degree of risk sharing around the 
world. The greater the momentum, the deeper the markets and wider the 
spectrum of risk-sharing instruments, greater will be shared ownership and 
participation by larger number of people in finance. Faster, deeper, wider 
financial development has a symbiotic relationship with globalization as the 
feedback process between the two strengthens both. Evidence suggests that, 
thus far, the degree of risk sharing achieved by globalization is insignificant. 
The paper presented reasons that explain why the degree of risk sharing and 
expected welfare gains from financial integration have been small: (i) as of 
yet, instruments have not been developed sufficiently to allow greater risk 
sharing, and (ii) many countries still need to achieve threshold levels of 
financial, legal, and institutional development required to allow greater risk 
sharing. It is believed that the process of liberalization of economies, adoption 
of best international standards, development of good legal/institutional 
framework and practice is gathering momentum in many countries, as is the 
pace of innovation of financial instruments. The paper suggests that parallel 
progress and challenges also characterize Islamic finance. While it has 
experienced a phenomenal success in the last two decades, Islamic finance has 
still a long way to go to achieve its objective of maximum risk sharing. The 
paper argued that the institutional structures ordained, within which Islamic 
finance is to operate, are those that promote good state and corporate 
governance, trust, protection of rights and contract enforcement. It was 
suggested that, in case of Islamic finance, the progress achieved to date is a 
negligible fraction of the potential. The reasons are identical to those offered 
in financial globalization. It is suggested that financial, legal, institutional 
developments, and greater pace of instrumentalization of basic modes of 
transactions permitted, would accelerate progress of Islamic finance. As it 
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would appear that Islamic finance and financial globalization share a common 
objective of achieving maximum risk sharing, it is not too unrealistic to expect 
convergence. It was also argued that legal and institutional developments as 
well as further advances in information technology will reduce informational 
problems and lead to growing trust which is essential for risk sharing. The 
result will be the dominance of equity in financial structures and relationships. 
The paper presented historical evidence of a globalization period, in the 
Middle Ages, when partnerships and equity participation were the dominant 
mode of finance. The breakdown of trust as a result of repeated wars and 
catastrophes as well as financial innovations, particularly securitization of 
government debt in the late Middle Ages, created the right milieu for the 
dominance of debt and debt finance which has lasted to the present day. 
Recent data appear to suggest that global finance may be experiencing an 
early stage of return of dominance of equity and risk sharing through the 
growth of Islamic financial techniques as well as greater innovation of equity-
based instruments within the conventional finance. And, therein lies the seeds 
of convergence. 
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1996-98 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total
Private capital flows, net2 159.3 74.6 56.7 70.2 88.3 173.3 238.6 257.2 255.8
  Private direct investment, net 142.3 177.4 168.6 182.8 152.2 165.3 190 266.3 266.9
  Private portfolio flows, net 60 60.1 11.4 -80.5 -90.9 -12.1 25 29.4 -76.3
  Other private capital flows, net -43 -162.9 -123.4 -32.1 26.9 20.1 23.5 -38.5 65.2
Official flows, net3 20.2 22.4 -34.2 6.6 2.3 -44.5 -57.8 -122.6 -143.8
Change in reserves4 -72.6 -98.2 -131.2 -120.6 -198.9 -358.9 -508.2 -590.1 -738.4
Memorandum
Current account5 -72.1 34.4 123.5 86.8 132.3 229.4 299.7 511.6 638.5
  Africa
  Private capital flows, net2      6.5 9 -4.2 2.2 0.9 2.7 12.3 18.3 20.2
    Private direct investment, net 5.8 8.6 7.6 23.1 13.5 15.4 16.8 27 19.1
    Private portfolio flows, net 5 9.1 -1.8 -7.9 -1.6 -0.5 5.4 4.1 18.5
-4.3 -8.7 -10 -13 -11 -12.2 -9.8 -12.8 -17.4
  Official flows, net3              5 4.1 7.7 6.5 8.6 6.4 4.3 -1.8 -3.8
  Change in reserves4 -4.2 -0.4 -12.8 -9.7 -5.5 -11.4 -32.7 -42.3 -48.4
  Central and eastern Europe
  Private capital flows, net2      27.4 36.3 38.7 10.9 54 52.5 74.7 117.5 121.1
    Private direct investment, net 14.9 22.7 24.1 24 24.1 16.2 34.5 50.1 65.8
    Private portfolio flows, net 1.7 5.3 3.1 0.4 1.7 6.5 26.9 20.9 8.1
10.8 8.3 11.6 -13.4 28.3 29.9 13.3 46.4 47.1
  Official flows, net3              -0.5 -2.4 1.6 6 -7.5 -5 -6.6 -8.3 -4.9
  Change in reserves4 -8.8 -12.1 -6 -3 -18.5 -11.5 -13.6 -48.2 -21.2
  Commonwealth of
     Independent States6
  Private capital flows, net2      -5.3 -13.5 -27.6 7.2 15.8 17.9 7.7 37.6 65.7
    Private direct investment, net 5.5 4.7 2.3 4.9 5.2 5.4 12.9 14.4 33.1
    Private portfolio flows, net 2.2 -0.9 -10 -1.2 0.4 -0.5 8.1 -3.1 13.9
-13 -17.3 -19.9 3.5 10.2 13 -13.4 26.3 18.8
  Official flows, net3              -1 -1.8 -5.8 -4.9 -10.4 -8.9 -7.3 -22.1 -32.6
  Change in reserves4 5.1 -6.4 -20.3 -14.5 -15.1 -31.8 -53.8 -75.6 -126.9
  Emerging Asia7
  Private capital flows, net2 36.9 -1.9 4.5 23.5 25.4 69.2 142.5 69.7 53.9
    Private direct investment, net 56 70.9 59.8 52 52.6 73.1 68 105.8 102.4
    Private portfolio flows, net 16 54.1 19.6 -50.2 -60.1 7.8 11.2 -8.1 -99.4
    Other private capital flows, net -35.1 -127 -74.8 21.6 32.8 -11.6 63.4 -27.9 50.9
  Official flows, net3              5.9 8.5 -10.9 -12 4.1 -16.6 -7 -2.8 -9.8
  Change in reserves4 -45.1 -84.8 -59.1 -85.4 -154.3 -234.3 -339 -284.1 -365.6
  Middle East8
  Private capital flows, net2      11.8 -3.8 -10 -5.5 -19.4 4.7 -12 -19.9 -15.5
    Private direct investment, net 7 4.4 4.9 12.3 9.7 17.8 8.8 17.6 12
    Private portfolio flows, net 0.5 -8.6 -1.2 -13.5 -17.4 -14.9 -14 -14.9 -5
4.3 0.4 -13.7 -4.3 -11.6 1.8 -6.8 -22.5 -22.5
  Official flows, net3              5.2 8 -20.5 -14.2 -9.8 -24.6 -32.5 -57.1 -75
  Change in reserves4 -8.1 -2 -31.2 -11.6 -3.1 -33.7 -45.7 -106.6 -129.7
  Western Hemisphere
  Private capital flows, net2      82 48.5 55.2 31.9 11.5 26.2 13.3 33.9 10.4
    Private direct investment, net 53.1 66.1 70 66.5 47.2 37.5 49.1 51.4 34.5
    Private portfolio flows, net 34.6 1 1.7 -8.1 -13.9 -10.5 -12.5 30.5 -12.4
-5.7 -18.6 -16.5 -26.5 -21.8 -0.9 -23.3 -48 -11.6
  Official flows, net3              5.6 6.2 -6.4 25.2 17.4 4.3 -8.7 -30.4 -17.7
  Change in reserves4 -11.4 7.4 -1.8 3.5 -2.4 -36.2 -23.4 -33.4 -46.5
  Memorandum
  Fuel exporting countries
  Private capital flows, net2   -5.4 -27.2 -57 -12.7 -11.2 12.7 -14.9 -6.8 -2.6
  Other countries
  Private capital flows, net2   164.8 101.8 113.6 82.9 99.5 160.6 253.4 264 258.4
   8Includes Israel.
   6Historical data have been revised, reflecting cumulative data revisions for Russia and the resolution of a number of data interpretation issues.
   7Consists of developing Asia and the newly industrialized Asian economies.
   2Because of data limitations, flows listed under "private capital flows, net" may include some official flows.
   3Excludes grants and includes overseas investments of official investment agencies.
   4A minus sign indicates an increase.
   5The sum of the current account balance, net private capital flows, net official flows, and the change in reserves equals, with the opposite sign, the sum of the capital account 
and errors and omissions. For regional current account balances, see Table 25 of the Statistical Appendix.
    Other private capital flows, net 
    Other private capital flows, net 
   1Net capital flows comprise net direct investment, net portfolio investment, and other long- and short-term net investment flows, including
official and private borrowing.  In this table, Hong Kong SAR, Israel, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China are included.
    Other private capital flows, net 
Table 1.  Emerging Market and Developing Countries: Net Capital Flows1
(Billions of U.S. dollars)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2007
    Other private capital flows, net 
    Other private capital flows, net 
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Table 2.  Equity Market Indices, 2002-06 
 
   End of period 
    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 World 792.2 1,036.3 1,169.3 1,257.8 1,483.6 
 Emerging Markets 292.1 442.8 542.2 706.5 912.7 
Latin America 658.9 1,100.9 1,483.6 2,150.0 2,995.7 
Asia 140.4 206.4 231.6 286.2 371.5 
Europe, Middle East, & 
Africa 108.4 163.9 222.7 300.3 364.4 
 
   Period on Periodic Percent Change 
     
 World -21.1 30.8 12.8 7.6 18.0 
 Emerging Markets -8.0 51.6 22.4 30.3 29.2 
Latin America -24.8 67.1 34.8 44.9 39.3 
Asia -6.2 47.1 12.2 23.5 29.8 
Europe, Middle East, & 
Africa 4.7 51.2 35.8 34.9 21.3 
 Source: International Monetary Fund: Global Financial Stability Report, April 2007 
 
 
 
Table 3. Nominal Percent Growth in Equity  
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
  
Equity market capitalization growth           
          
          
        
All sample countries -6.5 -20.1 65.2 -10.7 -5.5 1.5 59.7 29.7 46.1 7.7
Emerging markets 14.8 18.4 26.9 -6.4 -13.1 -16.0 34.0 17.2 9.8 13.4
Mature markets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 
Bond market capitalization growth 
All sample countries 20.0 6.6 5.7 7.8 -2.2 4.8 6.6 8.2 1.9 12.4
Emerging markets 9.6 24.1 28.0 20.7 24.2 25.5 28.9 21.2 5.6 19.2
Mature markets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Source:  International Monetary Fund: GFSR, April 2007.  43   
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Table 4. Equity and Bond Market Capitalization, 1996-2005 
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 (In Percent of GDP) 
 
 
Equity Market Capitalization 
All sample countries (54) 63.0 64.1 68.2 83.6 72.7 62.8 55.0 71.2 80.4 93.4
Emerging markets (29) 49.8 41.5 36.6 52.2 36.9 37.7 36.6 52.4 60.8 77.8
Mature markets (25) 75.1 85.0 100.7 118.1 112.0 91.7 74.3 93.0 102.9 110.3
 
 
Bond Market Capitalization 1
All sample countries (54) 67.1 66.4 73.1 67.4 68.2 72.7 83.1 89.6 94.5 94.0
Emerging markets (29) 31.2 31.1 37.9 41.0 40.0 46.0 50.6 52.1 51.2 49.3
Mature markets (25) 105.9 104.7 113.3 97.8 101.1 105.1 121.7 134.4 146.0 145.5
Sources: Datastream; S&PIFC Emerging Market Database; and, World Federation of Exchanges     
1 Domestic and international bonds.           
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Table 5. Growth in Equity and Bond Market Capitalization 
(Percent growth in the Ratio with respect to GDP) 
 
In Percent  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Equity Market Capitalization Growth        
All sample countries (54) 1.8 6.4 22.6 -13.0 -13.6 -12.4 29.4 13.0 16.1
Emerging markets (29) -16.7 -11.8 42.7 -29.3 2.2 -2.8 43.1 16.0 28.0
Mature markets (25) 13.2
 
18.5
 
17.2
 
-5.1
 
-18.1
 
-18.9
 
25.1
 
10.6
 
7.2
  
        
  
Bond Market Capitalization Growth 
All sample countries (54) -1.0 10.1 -7.8 1.2 6.6 14.3 7.8 5.5 -0.5
Emerging markets (29) -0.4 21.9 8.2 -2.5 15.0 9.9 3.0 -1.7 -3.7
Mature markets (25)  -1.1 8.2 -13.7 3.4 4.0 15.8
 
10.4
 
8.7 -0.3
 Source: International Monetary Fund: GFSR, April 2007. 
 
 
Table 6. Household Portfolio Allocation to Equity 
International Comparisons 
As a percentage of total financial assets composition at end-1995 and end-2003 
 
Share and 
other equity
of which: 
mutual funds 
shares 
 
Share and 
other 
equity 
of which: 
mutual 
funds 
shares 
  1995  2003 
Portugal 25 7  27 9 
Belgium 29 9  29 16 
Denmark 23 7  17 9 
Germany 19 7  22 12 
Spain 31 11  39 13 
France 35 12  36 10 
Italy 20 4  35 17 
The Netherlands 20 5  11 4 
Austria 6 4  16 10 
Finland 5 1  41 5 
Sweden 30 7  40 12 
United Kingdom 20 4  16 5 
Euro area (9) 24 8  29 11 
European Union (12) 23 7  26 9 
U.S.A. 46 5  48 10 
Japan 14 2  11 2 
Source: Fátima Cardoso and Vanda Gerlades da Cunha: Household wealth in Portugal: 
1980-2004, WP 4-05, June 2005. 
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Chart 1. Total Global Cross-Border Inflows
Total Flows
(In percent of world GDP and in 
billions of U.S. dollars)
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Chart 2. Equity Market Capitalization (in percent of GDP)
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Chart 3. Bond Market Capitalization (in percent of GDP)
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Chart 4. Equity Markets: 2000-06
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Source:  International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook, April 2007.
 
 
 
Chart 5. Portfolio Equity and FDI
Emerging Equity Markets: 2002-06
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Chart 6.  Cumulative Net Flows to Emerging Market Funds: 2001-06
                               (In billions of U.S. dollars)
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Source:  International Monetary Fund: Global Financial Stability Report, April 2007.  
 
 
Chart 7. Emerging Markets: FDI Outflows by Region: 1996-2006
                                 (In billions of U.S. dollars)
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  Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2007 . 
 
 
 
Chart 9. All Sample Countries 
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Chart 10. Mature Markets
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Chart 11. Emerging Markets
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